“[A]bsent special circumstances, Michigan courts have generally held that the hazards presented by snow, snow-covered ice, and observable ice are open and obvious and do not impose a duty on the premises possessor to warn of or remove the hazard.” Slaughter v Blarney Castle Oil Co, 281 Mich App 474, 481; 760 NW2d 287 (2008). Moreover, “the presence of wintery weather conditions and of ice on the ground elsewhere on the premises render[s] the risk of [ice] ‘open and obvious such that a reasonably prudent person would foresee the danger’ . . . .” Ragnoli v North Oakland-North Macomb Imaging, Inc, 500 Mich 967, 967 (2017).

Lay opinion testimony is permitted by MRE 701 as follows:

If the witness is not testifying as an expert, the witness’ testimony in the form of opinions or inferences, including how an accident occurred, is limited to those opinions or inferences which are (a) rationally based on the perception of the witness and (b) helpful to a clear understanding of the witness’ testimony or the determination of a fact in issue.

Courts have liberally applied MRE 701 to enable the trier of fact to develop a clearer understanding of the facts. People v Oliver, 170 Mich App 38, 50; 427 NW2d 898 (1988), mod on other grounds 433 Mich 862 (1989).

The elements of fraud required to void PIP coverage in an automobile policy are:

(1) the misrepresentation was material, (2) that it was false, (3) that the insured knew that it was false at the time it was made or that it was made recklessly, without any knowledge of its truth, and (4) that the insured made the material misrepresentation with the intention that the insurer would act upon it. A statement is material if it is reasonably relevant to the insurer’s investigation of a claim.” [Bahri v IDS Property Cas Ins Co, 308 Mich App 420, 424-425; 864 NW2d 609 (2014), quoting Mina v Gen Star Indemnity Co, 218 Mich App 678, 686; 555 NW2d 1 (1996), rev’d in part on other grounds 455 Mich 866 (1997).]

A landlord owes a duty to exercise reasonable care to protect his tenant “from an unreasonable risk of harm caused by a dangerous condition on the land,” Lugo v Ameritech Corp, Inc, 464 Mich 512, 516; 629 NW2d 384 (2001), this duty does not extend to “dangers [that] are known to the [tenant] or are so obvious that the [tenant] might reasonably be expected to discover them, Riddle v McLouth Steel Products Corp, 440 Mich 85, 96; 485 NW2d 676 (1992).

A one-inch difference between the living room and kitchen floors was an open and obvious condition. Further, the kitchen threshold did not present “special aspects” to impose liability despite its being open and obvious because the condition was not “effectively unavoidable,” leading to a “uniquely high likelihood of harm,” or impose “an unreasonably high risk of severe harm.” Lugo, 464 Mich at 518-519.

Healthcare providers do not possess a statutory cause of action against no-fault insurers for recovery of personal protection insurance benefits under the no-fault act. This conclusion does not mean that a healthcare provider is without recourse; a provider that furnishes healthcare services to a person for injuries sustained in a motor vehicle accident may seek payment from the injured person for the provider’s reasonable charges. Additionally, an insured may assign his or her rights to past or presently due benefits to a healthcare provider. MCL 500.3143.

Covenant Med Ctr, Inc v State Farm Mut Auto Ins Co.  Decided May 25, 2017. Michigan Supreme Court Docket Number 152758.